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ABSTRACT 
The extraction of the user activity is one of the main goals in the analysis of 
digital evidence. In this paper we present a methodology for extracting this 
activity by comparing multiple Restore Points found in the Windows XP 
operating system. The registry copies represent a snapshot of the state of the 
system at a certain point in time. Differences between them can reveal user 
activity from one instant to another. The algorithms for comparing the hives 
and interpreting the results are of high complexity. We develop an approach 
that takes into account the nature of the investigation and the characteristics of 
the hives to reduce the complexity of the comparison and result interpretation 
processes. The approach concentrates on hives that present higher activity and 
highlights only those differences that are relevant to the investigation. The 
approach is implemented as a software tool that is able to compare any set of 
offline hives and categorise the results according to the user needs. The 
categorisation of the results, in terms of activity will help the investigator in 
interpreting the results. In this paper we present a general concept of result 
categorisation to prove its efficiency on Windows XP, but these can be adapted 
to any Windows versions including the latest versions.   
Keywords: Windows Registry, Registry Restore-Points, User Activity, 
Forensic Registry 
1. INTRODUCTION 
System Restore is a process that monitors key system changes on a computer 
running Microsoft Windows. Whenever a change that could endanger the 
system’s stability is detected, System Restore copies the core system files and 
stores them in a hidden directory (“C:\System Volume 
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Information\_restore{GUID}”) in the files system before allowing the change 
to take place. If the subsequent change results in an unstable system the user 
can simply reload the last known good configuration and undo the damaging 
changes. Typically a large number of these time points, called Restore Points, 
are found in the system. They present a snapshot of the state of the system at 
that point in time. Differences between them can highlight significant user 
activity that could be useful to a criminal investigation. 
A number of different files are monitored by System Restore and are archived 
in the restore point (Microsoft (2007)). The user can specify which file types 
they want to monitor by modifying a particular system parameter. However, 
left as default, the system restore archives the Registry, COM+ database, the 
IIS metabase and other specific file extensions. A log of the changes is also 
stored.  
The most important of these are the registry hive files. The registry is a central 
hierarchical database used in Microsoft Windows operating systems to store 
information that is necessary to configure the system for the users, 
applications, and hardware devices. It provides a single location where 
installed programs, user profiles and settings can be stored and managed. 
Analysing different values in the registry not only reveals currently installed 
programs and the state of the operating system but would also give clues to 
recent opened files, folders, network connections, and other user activities. 
This paper presents a new methodology for extracting user activity from 
Windows Restore points. We design and implement a forensic registry analysis 
tool that is able to compare different Restore Points and hives. The results are 
presented to the investigators to help them in determining how the system was 
used between the snapshots. The approach consists of, firstly, comparing 
Restore Points selectively and, secondly, categorising the results in terms of 
evidence. Even thought we focus on extracting the differences between the 
registry hives of two or more Restore Points, the same technique can be 
applied to other sets of files found within those points. 
Restore Point Creation 
The number of registry Restore Points stored in the file system varies from 
computer to computer. The factors that influence their creation include how 
often new drivers and large programs are installed, if the computer is powered 
on constantly and whether the user has turned off restore point creation 
process. Regardless of these factors, Restore Points are likely to be found in the 
majority of the file systems. Once created, they store an exact copy of the 
active hives of the system registry. Honeycutt, J. (2002) described when 
Restore Points are created. 
? On Schedule: The default is 24 hours. 
? On Program Installation: The system may be backed up when a user 
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installs a software that uses a particular type of installer. 
? On Update: The system is backed up just before an update to the 
operating system takes place. 
? On System Restore: The system is backed up before a system is 
restored using one of the Restore Points. 
? On Driver Installation: Device drivers affect system stability so the 
system is backed up for security. 
? On User Request: Users can create manual restore points. 
The Restore Points are kept on disk for up to 90 days and are deleted after this 
time. As a result, it is not uncommon to find many different copies of the state 
of the system in a typical forensic investigation. Although these Restore Points 
are extremely useful to roll back unwanted system wide changes, they are also 
an invaluable forensic resource to provide insight about the state of the system 
at a given time. 
Test Setup 
Throughout the paper we will use a test file system to illustrate the 
investigative techniques on a practical example. The system is a typical 
independent computer using the Windows XP operating system. The computer 
configuration and other relevant data are shown below. All settings dictating 
the frequency of the restore point creation were left in their default values. 
Nevertheless, the creation of the Restore Points was not done at regular 
intervals. The differences between the Restore Point creations varied from a 
single day to 10 days. In this case study the Restore Points found in the system 
had a total time range of 2½ months. In the rest of the paper, the Restore Points 
will be referred to with respect to its creation name (i.e., RP11) and the number 
of days after the oldest hive was created (i.e. RP11 (25 days)). In this way a 
perspective is maintained on the time range between two Restore Points. 
 
Computer Manufacturer Dell 
Operating System Windows XP SP2 
Number of Restore Points 17 
Time Range of Restore Points 2 months 
Frequency of Use Light to Medium Use 
 
Table 1: Test system configuration 
 
The above computer system is used to demonstrate how user activity can be 
recreated by comparing the Restore Points. Initially we focus on the registry 
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hives within these points. The validity of the activity found was confirmed by 
interviewing the owner of the system. The demonstrations use the 
“SOFTWARE” and “ntuser.dat” hives respectively, since they hold most of the 
interesting evidence. Other hives can be used in a similar manner. 
RPCompare 
RPCompare, (Restore Point Compare), is a tool for extracting and studying the 
user activity through Restore Points. It is designed to compare the Restore 
Points in an offline forensic environment and present the differences to the 
investigator. It does not use the WMI interface or any inbuilt Windows 
functions. The tool is primarily designed to extract and compare the various 
registry hive files and highlight any of the keys and values that have been 
deleted, added or modified in the interim. The tool contains two phases: 
? Comparison phase: The registry entries are compared to identify 
which keys have changed between time points. 
? Interpretation phase: The differences are analysed to interpret their 
meaning with respect to user activity. 
Registry Comparison Phase 
RPCompare extracts the registry entries from any number of Restore Points 
and compares either their keys or their values. The keys that present 
differences are extracted and tagged with “Added”, “Modified” or “Removed” 
with respect to the more recent registry. The comparison is done as follows. 
RPCompare uses the naming conventions of the Restore Points to order the 
points. Each Restore Point is named RPxx with xx being the rank of the restore 
point (Bunting, S. (2008)). RPCompare also utilizes the “Last Written Time” 
values present in all of the registry keys including the root key. The value is 
updated by Windows whenever an operation “write” or “modify” is carried out 
on the data of the key. The time written to the value depends on the system 
clock, which can be manipulated by the user. For the purposes of this study, we 
assume that the time is an accurate reflection on the real time, and that the time 
is consistent throughout the Restore Points.  
RPCompare recursively traverses the length of each hive tree comparing every 
node's time values. All the relations are with respect to the earlier node. If a 
node has a different time value to its corresponding node in the next hive then 
that node is tagged as “Modified”. If it does not exist in the next hive then it 
has been “Removed”. Finally, if a new node has been found in the new hive 
then it has been “Added”. Values are compared only for those keys that have 
been tagged as modified. Once the set of differences has been found, it is 
presented to the user for interpretation. 
Interpretation Phase 
The hive keys have a wide number of purposes and they may or may not 
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change as a direct result of user actions. Some changes are due to automatic 
system processes such as program updates or system checks while others are 
directly attributed to the user conducting a specific activity. The roles of a large 
number of registry keys have been documented in both forensic 
(ForensicMatter (2008)) and non forensic fields and can easily be referenced if 
they are found to have been changed between time points. A forensic 
investigation is case specific and, therefore, not all information presented by 
RPCompare may be useful. It is up to the investigator to filter out irrelevant 
changes and extract only the information that is relevant to the case. 
Performance 
RPCompare has a number of important performance issues, which may 
adversely affect the efficiency of an investigation. Since RPCompare compares 
every key with its corresponding key in another hive, the complexity of its 
execution is O(n*m), where n and m are the number of keys in the hive. In the 
worst-case scenario, if the key is at the root of the hive, the whole hive will be 
compared. In our tests, comparison of a mature hive, such as a SOFTWARE 
hive, is very time consuming; as such we present a number of techniques to 
concentrate on specific branches of the hive or to limit the time range of the 
comparisons. 
Moreover, the interpretation of the results is currently done by inspecting each 
set of differences by hand. In the case of a complete comparison across all the 
Restore Points, the time needed to perform the interpretation will be very long 
and in some situations make this tool impractical. Therefore, we come up with 
two main improvements for both phases to make RPCompare more efficient.  
Firstly, we developed a progressively detailed a view of the data to guide the 
investigator in concentrating on the hives with high user activity. We classify 
the techniques into two categories; those that attempt to find large-scale 
differences in the system such as installations/uninstallations of programs and 
those techniques that attempt to recreate the minute steps of the user. The latter 
involves the processing of Most Recently Used (MRU) lists and other private 
attribute information that can highlight how the user used the system. A special 
processing needs to be carried out on these types of registry entries to 
understand their meaning and their relationships with the user. The Large Scale 
Comparison and the User Activity Sections detail this methodology. 
Secondly, we developed and implemented a technique that attempts to discard 
differences that are irrelevant to the investigation at hand. Specific evidence 
types can be analysed if they are deemed to be relevant to the investigation. 
Other non-relevant types may be ignored. Therefore, we employ rules to 
classify the differences into a set of evidence types. The Categorisation Section 
details a sample of the rules employed to categorise the differences in these 
evidence types.   
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Figure 1: Sizes of the SOFTWARE and ntuser.dat Hives 
 Blue line: Total Hive Space, Red Line: Total Unallocated Hive Space 
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2. LARGE SCALE HIVE COMPARISON 
The investigator may need to expose large spots of activity and illustrate what 
was the general use of the system over a long period of time. User activity such 
as installation and uninstallation of programs and the addition or deletion of 
user accounts can be detected by comparing the registries of the system taken 
before and after the activity. The following technique illustrates a method on 
how the registries are compared in a progressively detailed manner. The 
process involves highlighting the areas of large activity by comparing file sizes 
first, selectively comparing the entire hives, then branches and finally values. 
The progressively detailed comparisons allow the investigators to streamline 
the comparison process and avoid spending too much time on complete hive 
comparisons.   
Registry Size Comparisons 
The first procedure entails comparing the sizes of the hives against each other. 
The differences can highlight some important changes that have occurred 
between time points in a relatively quick manner. Although small changes may 
not be noticeable, a large change to the hive, such as a program installation, 
can be easily spotted by comparing the hive sizes. The results can highlight a 
time point of high activity and bring it to the attention of the user for further 
investigation. 
Variations in sizes highlight additions to the registry but it cannot show activity 
that removes keys from the hives. The extraction of unallocated space in the 
hive can be used to accomplish this aim. Whenever a key or a set of keys is 
deleted, due to an uninstallation or registry cleaning for example, the space left 
by the removed keys is marked as empty and is kept for future use 
(Russinovich (2008)). The hives never shrink to compress this space and 
therefore do not reveal the uninstallation in its file size. In order to highlight 
this fact, RPCompare calculates the amount of free space in the registry 
alongside the total amount of used space. Sharp increases in the total amount of 
unallocated space imply large-scale removal of keys. 
Figure 1 shows the sizes of the hives in the case study. The size of the 
SOFTWARE hive increased at the latter part of the graph; between RP14 and 
RP15 which relate to 37th day and 49th day after the oldest restore point. 
Similarly, in the “ntuser.dat” file, the total space rises sharply between RP5 and 
RP6 or the 9th and 10th day after the oldest hive. Deallocated space has largely 
remained constant except between RP0 to RP1 and RP13 to RP14. The 
investigator can therefore narrow the range of the comparison for closer 
analysis. 
RPCompare was executed on the SOFTWARE and “ntuser.dat” hives to 
recover the keys that were added at the above times. In the case of the 
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SOFTWARE hive, RPCompare found that keys relating to the installation of 
the .NetFramework were responsible for the size increase in the 10 day time 
range between RP14 and RP15. 
In the case of the “ntuser.dat” hive, the size of the hive began to increase at 
RP3 (7 days after the first restore point) with a huge size increase at RP6 and a 
steady increase thereafter. Comparison of RP5 and RP6 resulted in the 
identification of 143 Added, 111 Modified, and 4 Removed keys. This result is 
shown in the Registry Compare window, as shown in Figure 2. The majority of 
added keys are related to a DameWare (DameWare 2008) program. Upon 
further investigation, this program was found to be a PC remote control utility. 
Although in this case the installation was for innocent use, if the investigator is 
looking for a particular type of criminal activity this can be seen as vital 
evidence. The progressive increase in hive size from RP12 was attributed to 
new keys being added in the “ShellNoRoam” branch of the hive. These keys 
store window positioning preferences for each folder in the file system and are 
discussed further on in this paper. New “ShellNoRoam” keys indicate creation 
of new folders in the file system. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: 143 Added, 111 Modified, 4 Removed Keys between Time Points 5 
and 6 
 
Registry Branch Comparisons 
Once a branch of a hive has been found and suspected to contain evidence, 
RPCompare can take the root of that branch and compare it with similar 
branches in other hives. Because comparing a single branch is much faster than 
comparing the whole tree hierarchy, the investigator can concentrate on 
particular aspects of the hive at any given time relatively efficiently. 
Returning to the DameWare example above, the DameWare Development key 
was compared to all the hives that were created after its installation. None of 
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the hives reported any differences. This suggests that the program was rarely 
used. Upon further investigation it was found that the program was installed as 
a trial and not actively utilized. Progressively detailed key or branch 
comparisons can also be carried out if the investigator deemed it to be 
necessary. 
3. USER ACTIVITY EXTRACTION 
The registry contains many important locations that can be directly associated 
to the user and the way that the system was used at the time of the registry 
snapshot. The “Most Recently Used” (MRU) lists store evidence of files 
names, programs and other information that has been opened by the user in the 
recent past. They have been particularly highlighted as highly valuable pieces 
of user activity (Honeycutt 2002), ForensicMatter.com (2008)). These 
locations are widely known and are actively analysed in most investigations. 
The investigator may look manually at the MRUs in the Restore Points but this 
can be extremely laborious. RPCompare can extract an MRU key, compare it 
across different Restore Points and extract the user activity that the MRUs 
held. This section elaborates on the MRUs and how they can be processed to 
gain understanding of user activity. 
Registry MRU Management 
The MRU key is a standard in Windows that store the most recently used items 
in the system. Each MRU ‘listens’ for a particular user activity and updates its 
content if this activity occurs. They store two types of values; a value for each 
of the entries and an index value, the MRU value, which stores a list of the 
entries in order of most recent. 
For example, the 
“HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ComDlg32\O
penSaveMRU” key stores the most recent files opened in the Windows open 
dialogue. The subkeys of the key store entries for specific file extensions. Any 
new open file is captured as a value in the extension’s MRU with an unused 
index as its name and the filename as its data. The index is placed at the head 
of the MRU list signifying that it is the most recent. Only a limited number of 
indexes exist, so if there is no free one, the oldest entry in the list is removed 
and its index is given to the new entry. If a command has been executed and is 
already present in the MRU key, then its index is simply upgraded in the MRU 
list. No new values are created.  
RPCompare and the MRU Timeline 
In order to compare the MRU keys correctly, RPCompare contains an 
algorithm to combine the MRU lists and disregards any reoccurring 
differences. Therefore, if only one new entry is found, only the new command 
will be highlighted in the report. In this way the analyst can get a clear history 
of the list without being confused by the other repetitive values. 
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RPCompare was executed on the ‘OpenSaveMRU’ key to extract the user 
activity held in this MRU. A timeline of the different MRU’s timestamps can 
be created to illustrate this more easily. Figures 3 and 4 show the different 
perspectives. Figures 3 show a textual representation (obscured for privacy) 
while Figure 4 shows a timeline where peaks indicate higher amounts of new 
MRU entries and therefore more user activity.  
Very few new MRU entries are created even for an extended time range. This 
low user activity indicates that the computer system was used very lightly. This 
corroborates the stated system specifications in the Test Setup Section. 
Although only ‘OpenSaveMRU’ was analysed, RPCompare can aggregate 
other MRUs from other locations in the registry in a similar manner. The more 
timestamps that are collected the more accurate the MRU time line becomes.     
 
 
Figure 3: OpenSaveMRU textual Time line 
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Figure 4: OpenSaveMRU Graphed Timeline 
 
 
 
Figure 5: BagMRU key. Each bag is numerically named and represents a folder 
in the file system 
 
Shell Bag MRU 
As mentioned above, a large number of ‘ShellNoRoam’ keys are continuously 
created and are responsible for the size increase in “ntuser.dat” hive. These 
keys store positional information of windows for each folder in the file system. 
Each folder (bag) has its own MRU storing information about its subfolders 
that were accessed most recently. If a folder is opened and the position of its 
window changed, then those coordinates are saved in the folders’ bag. The 
parent MRU bag will be updated to reflect that the sub-folder has now been 
accessed the most recently. Not all folders have a bag. If a folder is never 
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opened, it will not contain a representative bag. However, if the folder does 
have a bag and the folder is subsequently deleted, the bag will not be 
automatically deleted. The bags are therefore an important source of 
information for the folders in particular and user activity in general. 
As shown in Figure 5, all bags are stored under the 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\ShellNoRoam\ BagMRU key and 
do not contain the same name as the folders they represent. Rather, the bags are 
numerically named with the actual folder names being stored in the bag’s 
parent key. In addition to storing all bags, the BagMRU key stores an MRU of 
the most recently accessed folders. 
RPCompare is able to process this information and extract the user activity 
with respect to folders in a similar manner to the ‘OpenSaveMRU’. However, 
since every folder of the system has its own MRU, these keys contain much 
more information than the OpenSaveMRUs. It allows the investigator to 
highlight which folders where opened by the user and which were the most 
widely used over a period of time.  
RPCompare was executed on the BagMRU key to extract the timeline of the 
most accessed folders in the case study. Figure 6 shows a sample of the activity 
over a 4-week period. The folder ‘Cry’ is highlighted since it is present in 4 out 
of 8 Restore Points. This indicates that the screen position of the folder ‘Cry’ 
was changed at least 4 times in that time period. The user must have opened 
this folder and repositioned its window at least 4 times. The name of the folder 
is present more frequently than others and we can conclude that this folder is 
accessed more frequently than others. This is a significant user activity, if an 
investigator is looking for an activity relating to a suspiciously named folder, 
and this can be seen as vital incriminating evidence. Figure 6 also shows a 
folder called ‘Assignment’ being frequently accessed. Although it is not 
accessed as frequently as ‘Cry’, it provides a number of avenues for 
investigation. In this case, ‘Cry’ is a video games folder, while ‘Assignment’ is 
office related. 
MRUs, for specific folders, which are found in the individual bags, are in a 
similar format. Using RPCompare, the investigator can extract any user 
activity relating to any folder in the system. In particular, deleted folders can be 
identified by correlating the bag names with the existing folders in the file 
system. The investigator can combine the evidence found in the Bag MRUs 
with those MRUs relating to the files to get more details about the user activity.  
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Figure 6: MRU list of the most recently accessed folders. Highlighting ‘Cry’ 
folder Access is done manually 
 
4. ACTIVITY CATEGORISATION  
The previous section detailed a methodology to make the comparison phase of 
RPCompare more efficient. In the same manner, this section will detail the 
RPCompare components used to increase the efficiency of the result 
interpretation phase. 
To reduce the complexity of the interpretation, RPCompare classifies all the 
differences into categories. In particular, it classifies the differences into 
categories of evidence. Each evidence category relates to a specific type of 
activity that can be individually analysed. In conducting a case, the user can 
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leave out any categories that are judged not to be relevant. To achieve this, 
RPCompare has been enhanced to recognise keys and automatically attribute 
them to one category or another. An informal categorisation was applied 
throughout the previous sections. Here we will detail only the rules used to 
reason about the test system.  
1. Software Installation / Uninstallation 
Software vendors typically create their registry keys using the 
‘HKLM\Software\Manufacturer\Product\ Version’ standard. All keys 
relating to the software are placed under this key and other vendors do 
not use keys that are found under a different vendor name. For 
instance, Figure 2 shows that the key 
“$$$PROTO.HIV\Software\DameWare Development\NT Utilities”1 
was added. Many of the 114 added keys fall under this main key. 
Therefore, it was correctly inferred that software called “NT Utilities” 
created by “DameWare Development” was installed in the system.  
Rule 1: New software is installed in the system, if a new key is added 
to the “HKLM\Software” or the “HKCU\Software”.   
Similarly, if the “NT Utilities” key is removed, then one can conclude 
that the software is uninstalled. 
2. Software Execution 
When a program is executed Windows normally changes/updates the 
registry keys that correspond to that program. Non-malicious software 
would not modify any key that belongs to another software vendor. In 
the DameWare Development example, it was correctly stated that 
DameWare was not executed much because no key was found to have 
been modified under its registry branch.  
Rule 2: Software has been executed if one of its keys has been 
modified. 
Some software programs use the registry very lightly and may not 
modify any of its keys if it is executed. However, this pattern can be 
used in conjunction with any other avenues of investigation.  
3. New MRU Entries 
                                                 
1 In registry hives, $$$PROTO.HIV is the binary version of the root key 
name and is replaced with the hive name by RegEdit when it is opened. 
In this case the hive is the “nutser.dat” and would be replaced by 
HKCU. 
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In Windows XP each MRU contains a ‘list’ value called “MRUList” or 
“MRUListEx” listing file names in order of last access. This identifies 
the “OpenSaveMRU” and the “ShellNoRoam” keys discussed in 
Extraction of User Activity Section. The Registry MRU Management 
Section describes how MRUs are used. 
Rule 3: If a key contains ‘MRU’ in its name or a value called 
“MRUList” or “MRUListEx”, then it is an MRU key. 
Non Operating System MRUs do not follow the list naming convention 
or its list value is empty. Their order is maintained by numbering each 
of their elements. Currently, RPCompare identifies only MRU keys 
that follow the naming convention. 
 
In addition, RPCompare can report if new USB or external hard drives have 
been connected to the computer or if new file extensions have been created for 
the system. The categories of evidence have been limited to a small number but 
can be expanded by adding more rules to RPCompare. Many of the rules are 
based on existing registry guides and documented roles of keys. The rules 
allow the results to be divided into evidence types and this operation reduces 
considerably the interpretation of the results. 
5. RELATED WORK 
Registry comparison softwares have existed for a number of years in the 
registry analysis fields (RegDiff (Ver3.3), WinDiff (Ver5.1) (2001)). Exact 
registry specifications have not been published by Microsoft. Therefore, one of 
the techniques to see what the function is of any key is to take snapshots of the 
registry before and after known activity and analyse the difference (Microsoft 
(2008), Honeycutt (2002)). However, these programs are limited in either the 
focus of the comparison and on what hives they operate on. Most of the 
registry comparison softwares are limited to comparing .REG files (ASCII 
versions of the binary registry hives). Each time a snapshot is taken, the 
relevant hive is exported with the inbuilt Microsoft RegEdit32 tool. This added 
step is undesirable in the forensic community where the goal is to avoid any 
modification of the original file. Other tools (RegDiff (Ver3.3)) can compare 
only the active registries and rely on commands provided by Microsoft Win32 
API to extract relevant registry keys. Therefore they are unsuitable for offline 
registry analysis. 
The tools mentioned above can only compare two hives at any one time and 
are not designed for digital forensic investigations. RPCompare differs to these 
programs since it has a digital forensic focus and aims to extract meaning out 
of the differences with respect to the user activity. It can parse any offline 
registry hive even when it is extracted from a live system independently from 
any API.  
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The investigators have for a long time acknowledged the value of analysing the 
registry for evidence (Carvey (2005), Carvey (2007)). Guides have been 
published explaining which keys are the most relevant to a particular 
investigation (ForensicMatter.com (2008)). Most current forensic suites, 
EnCase (Encase (Ver6.8) (2008)) or Forensic Toolkit (FTK (Ver1.62.1) 
(2008)), contain registry parsers that can parse any registry hive files and 
present the contents to the investigator for analysis. However, the forensic 
analysis of the restore points has been treated the same as the analysis of the 
active registry. Namely, the investigator must open the hive files manually and 
access the different registry keys.  
Research into analysis of the registry with respect to retrieval of deleted data 
has been done by Morgan (2008) and Kim et al. (2008). The latter concentrated 
on retrieving still active keys not deleted by uninstalled programs. These clues 
are highly dependent on the uninstallation process of the software and may not 
reveal much information. 
Research into Restore Points with respect to forensics has only been tackled 
recently (Bunting (2008), Carvey (2006), Harms (2006)). Harms has illustrated 
how the information stored in the Restore Points can be used to uncover 
evidence of a system intrusion. However, the author concentrates on the 
analysis of the “change.log” file only. This file is created at every Restore 
Point and tracks all files saved throughout the restore process. The registry hive 
files are not analysed. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper presented a new approach for extracting user activity in a digital 
forensic investigation. Namely, it focuses on comparisons of the Restore Points 
in general and the registry hives stored within them in particular. Differences 
between these hives can highlight changes in user activity that can be useful for 
the investigation. We introduce a tool, RPCompare; an offline, self contained 
and integrated environment that can compare Restore Points and registry hives 
and present the differences in a clear and logical interface. We also present a 
methodology using this tool to streamline the investigative process. Two 
techniques were presented in particular. The first focuses on the registry in its 
entirety and attempts to ascertain time points of high user activity. This activity 
includes what software was installed and removed and which keys were added 
or deleted relating to this activity. The technique, based on comparisons of hive 
size as well as content, is structured in a series of progressively detailed 
comparisons, which highlight areas of a user activity with progressively higher 
levels of accuracy. The technique guides the investigator away from time 
consuming wholesale hive comparison and into much more efficient selective 
hive and branch comparison.  
The second technique focuses on the user trail and recovers and analyses the 
Most Recent Used (MRU) keys of the hives. The analysis of the MRUs 
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requires specific processing to be investigated properly. The user activity is 
extracted with respect to ‘file open’ MRUs as well as ‘folder access’ MRUs to 
get a complete user trail. In particular we showed how RPCompare can reveal 
which folders and files the user accessed more frequently. Using both the 
timestamps of the MRUs and the hives, RPCompare presents an informative 
account of how the system was used in a clear and useful manner to the 
investigator. 
7. FUTURE WORK 
RPCompare will be further enhanced to streamline the techniques presented 
above and to add new functionality in both the comparison and interpretation 
phases. In this paper, we have concentrated mainly on the registry hives found 
within the Restore Points. Further work needs to be done to allow the software 
to utilise other similar files in the Restore Points and gather more information 
on what has changed between one point and another.  
As described in the Large Scale Registry Comparison section, the investigator 
progressively narrows down their analysis of the registry entries by focusing on 
a smaller number of branches. At the start of this process, a large number of 
differences may be returned that may be irrelevant to the investigation. In the 
DameWare scenario for example, a large number of 
“HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\” keys were 
present. These keys store positional information on windows that the user has 
opened. Although it may be relevant to the investigator to parse these and 
extract useful information from them, in finding traces of added / removed 
programs, these keys are not relevant. Future development of RPCompare will 
include filters to remove unwanted keys from the results or mark them as being 
irrelevant to the case. 
Future work will also be carried out to fully automate the interpretation phase. 
There is a number of registry guides that document specific registry keys 
relevant to forensics (ForensicMatter (2008)). These keys, as well as the roles 
they play in Windows XP will be encoded in RPCompare to allow automatic 
interpretation of the differences. The general categories discussed in the 
previous sections are not exhaustive and contain many sub categories that can 
further divide activities. Future development of RPCompare will include the 
addition of new categories organised in a hierarchical and logical manner.  
The rules discussed in the Categorisation Section lack formality and cannot be 
used for automatic reasoning and inference. The rules will be formally 
specified and will relate to user activity to specific registry keys and locations. 
This will result in an ontology of concepts and rules which can be used to 
reason and infer new knowledge from existing data.  Ontology of activity, 
relating different concepts of the criminal investigation to each other with 
formal attributes, will be developed to create a model of the investigation and 
will be used as a unifying, application independent source of information for 
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all registry software, including RPCompare.  
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